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Interactive Intelligence: Behaviour-based AI,
Musical HCI and the Turing Test
Adam Linson, Chris Dobbyn and Robin Laney1
Abstract. The ﬁeld of behaviour-based artiﬁcial intelligence (AI),
with its roots in the robotics research of Rodney Brooks, is not pre-
dominantly tied to linguistic interaction in the sense of the classic
Turing test (or, “imitation game”). Yet, it is worth noting, both are
centred on a behavioural model of intelligence. Similarly, there is
no intrinsic connection between musical AI and the language-based
Turing test, though there have been many attempts to forge connec-
tions between them. Nonetheless, there are aspects of musical AI
and the Turing test that can be considered in the context of non-
language-based interactive environments–in particular, when dealing
with real-time musical AI, especially interactive improvisation soft-
ware. This paper draws out the threads of intentional agency and
human indistinguishability from Turing’s original 1950 characteri-
sation of AI. On the basis of this distinction, it considers different
approaches to musical AI. In doing so, it highlights possibilities for
non-hierarchical interplay between human and computer agents.
1 Introduction
The ﬁeld of behaviour-based artiﬁcial intelligence (AI), with its roots
in the robotics research of Rodney Brooks, is not predominantly tied
to linguistic interaction in the sense of the classic Turing test (or,
“imitation game” [24]). Yet, it is worth noting, both are centred on
a behavioural model of intelligence. Similarly, there is no intrin-
sic connection between musical AI and the language-based Turing
test, though there have been many attempts to forge connections be-
tween them. The primary approach to applying the Turing test to
music is in the guise of so-called “discrimination tests”, in which
human- and computer-generated musical output are compared (for
an extensive critical overview of how the Turing test has been ap-
plied to music, see [1]). Nonetheless, there are aspects of musical
AI and the Turing test that can be considered in the context of non-
language-based interactive environments—in particular, when deal-
ing with real-time musical AI, especially interactive improvisation
software (see, for example, [23] and [8]). In this context, AI for non-
hierarchical human-computer musical improvisation such as George
Lewis’ Voyager [16] and Turing’s imitation game are both examples
of “an open-ended and performative interplay between [human and
computer] agents that are not capable of dominating each other” [21].
2 Background
It is useful here to give some context to the Turing test itself. In its
original incarnation, the test was proposed as a thought experiment
to explain the concept of a thinking machine to a public uninitiated
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in such matters [24]. Rather than as a litmus test of whether or not
a machine could think (which is how the test is frequently under-
stood), the test was in fact designed to help make sense of the con-
cept of a machine that could think. Writing in 1950, he estimates
“about ﬁfty years’ time” until the technology would be sufﬁcient to
pass a real version of the test and states his belief “that at the end of
the century the use of words and general educated opinion will have
altered so much that one will be able to speak of machines thinking
without expecting to be contradicted”. Thus his original proposal re-
mained a theoretical formulation: in principle, a machine could be
invented with the capacity to be mistaken for a human; if this goal
were accomplished, a reasonable person should accept the machine
as a thinking entity. He is very clear about the behaviourist underpin-
nings of the experiment:
May not machines carry out something which ought to be de-
scribed as thinking but which is very different from what a man
does? This objection is a very strong one, but at least we can
say that if, nevertheless, a machine can be constructed to play
the imitation game satisfactorily, we need not be troubled by
this objection.
He goes on to describe the “imitation game” as one in which the
machine should “try to provide answers that would naturally be given
by a man”. His ideas became the basis for what eventually emerged
as the ﬁeld of AI.
As Turing emphasised, the thought experiment consisted of an ab-
stract, “imaginable” machine that—under certain conditions to en-
sure a level playing ﬁeld—would be indistinguishable from a hu-
man, from the perspective of a human interrogator [24]. Presently,
when the test is actually deployed in practice, it is easy to forget the
essential role of the designer, especially given the fact that the com-
puter “playing” the game is, to an extent, thrust into the spotlight. In a
manner of speaking, the interactive computer takes centre stage, and
attention is diverted from the underlying challenge set forth by Tur-
ing: to determine the speciﬁcations of the machine. Thus, one could
say in addition to being a test for a given machine, it is also a creative
design challenge to those responsible for the machine. The stress is
on design rather than implementation, as Turing explicitly suggests
imagining that any proposed machine functions perfectly according
to its speciﬁcations (see [24], p. 449). If the creative design challenge
were fulﬁlled, the computer would behave convincingly as a human,
perhaps hesitating when appropriate and occasionally refusing to an-
swer or giving incorrect answers such as the ones Turing imagines
[24]:
Q: Please write me a sonnet on the subject of the Forth Bridge.
A: Count me out on this one. I never could write poetry.
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Q: Add 34957 to 70764.
A: (Pause about 30 seconds and then give as answer) 105621.
The implication of Turing’s example is that the measure of success
for those behind the machine lies in designing a system that is also
as stubborn and fallible as humans, rather than servile and (theoreti-
cally) infallible, like an adding machine.
3 Two threads unraveled
Two threads can be drawn out of Turing’s behavioural account of in-
telligence that directly pertain to contemporary AI systems: the ﬁrst
one concerns the kind of intentional agency suggested by his exam-
ple answer, “count me out on this one”; the second one concerns the
particular capacities and limitations of human embodiment, such as
the human inability to perform certain calculations in a fraction of a
second and the human potential for error. More generally, the second
thread has to do with the broadly construed linguistic, social, men-
tal and physical consequences of human physiology. Indeed, current
theories of mind from a variety of disciplines provide a means for
considering these threads separately. In particular, relevant investi-
gations that address these two threads—described in this context as
intentional agency and human indistinguishability—can be found in
psychology, philosophy and cognitive science.
3.1 Intentional agency
The ﬁrst thread concerns the notion of intentional agency, consid-
ered here separately from the thread of human indistinguishability.
Empirical developmental psychology suggests that the human pre-
disposition to attribute intentional agency to both humans and nonhu-
mans appears to be present from infancy. Poulin-Dubois and Shultz
chart childhood developmental stages over the ﬁrst three years of
life, from the initial ability to identify agency (distinguishing animate
from inanimate objects) on to the informed attribution of intention-
ality, by inference of goal-directed behavior [22]. Csibra found that
infants ascribed goal-directed behavior even to artiﬁcially animated
inanimate objects, if the objects were secretly manipulated to display
teleological actions such as obstacle avoidance [7]. Kira´ly, et al. iden-
tify the source of an infant’s interpretation of a teleological action: “if
the abstract cues of goal-directedness are present, even very young
infants are able to attribute goals to the actions of a wide range of
entities even if these are unfamiliar objects lacking human features”
[10].
It is important to note that in the above studies, the infants were
passive, remote observers, whereas the Turing test evaluates direct
interaction. While the predisposition of infants suggests an impor-
tant basis for such evaluation, more is needed to address interactiv-
ity. In another area of empirical psychology, a study of adults by
Barrett and Johnson suggests that even a lack of apparent goals by a
self-propelled (nonhuman) object can lead to the attribution of inten-
tionality in an interactive context [2]. In particular, their test subjects
used language normally reserved for humans and animals to describe
the behaviour of artiﬁcially animated inanimate objects that appeared
to exhibit resistance to direct control in the course of an interaction;
when there was no resistance, they did not use such language. The
authors of the study link the results of their controlled experiment to
the anecdotal experience of the frustration that arises during inter-
actions with artifacts such as computers or vehicles that “refuse” to
cooperate. In other words, in an interactive context, too much pas-
sivity by an artiﬁcial agent may negate any sense of its apparent
intentionality. This suggests that for an agent to remain apparently
intentional during direct interaction, it must exhibit a degree of resis-
tance along with the kind of adaptation to the environment that indi-
cates its behaviour is being adjusted to attain a goal. These features
appear to be accounted for in Turing’s ﬁrst example answer above:
the answer is accommodating insofar as it is a direct response to the
interrogator, but the show of resistance seems to enhance the sense
of “intelligence”. It is noteworthy that this particular thread, inten-
tional agency, relates closely to Brooks’ extension of intelligence to
nonlinguistic, nonhuman intelligence, especially in relation to insect
and other animal intelligence, which he has emulated in robotic form
with his particular approach to AI (see [3]).
3.2 Human indistinguishability
The second thread, the idea that human capacities and limitations
should be built into an AI system, strongly relates to many signiﬁ-
cant accounts of embodied, situated activity (see, for example, [9],
[4] and [11]). These accounts focus on how the human body, brain,
mind and environment fundamentally structure the process of cogni-
tion, which can be understood through observable behaviour. When
dealing with AI, the focus on behaviour clearly ties back to Turing.
These themes are also taken up in Brooks’ behaviour-based AI ap-
proach, but, at least in his early research, he applies them primarily
to nonhuman intelligence. In particular, he relates these themes to the
kinds of adaptive behaviour described in the ﬁrst thread. The differ-
ing properties of the second thread will come into sharper focus by
returning to Turing’s example, for a consideration of matters partic-
ular to humans.
Although Turing’s example of pausing and giving an incorrect an-
swer is a clear example of a human limitation over a machine, it is
possible to give an inverted example of human and machine compe-
tence that applies equally well. If the question posed to the machine
were instead “Is it easy to walk from here to the nearest supermar-
ket?”, the machine’s answer would depend on how its designers han-
dled the notion of “easy to walk to”. In this case, the machine must
not only emulate humans’ abstract cognitive limitations when solv-
ing arithmetical problems; it must also be able to respond according
to human bodily limitations. One could easily imagine a failed ma-
chine calculation: the supermarket is at the end of a single straight
road, with no turns; it answers “yes, it is easy to walk to”. But if the
supermarket is very distant, or nearby but up a steep incline, then
in order for the machine to give an answer that is indistinguishable
from a human one, it must respond in a way that seems to share
our embodied human limitations. Returning to the arithmetic exam-
ple, as Doug Lenat points out, even some wrong answers are more
human than others: “93 − 25 = 78 is more understandable than
if the program pretends to get a wrong answer of 0 or −9998 for
that subtraction problem” [14]. Although Lenat disputes the need for
embodiment in AI (he prefers a central database of human common
sense [13], which could likely address the “easy to walk to” exam-
ple), it could be argued, following the above theoretical positions,
that the set of humanlike wrong answers is ultimately determined by
the “commonalities of our bodies and our bodily and social experi-
ence in the world” [11].
This second thread, which could also be characterised as the at-
tempt to seem humanlike, is taken up in another nonlinguistic area of
AI, namely, musical AI. Some “intelligent” computer music compo-
sition and performance systems appear very close to achieving hu-
man indistinguishability in some respects, although this is not al-
ways their explicitly stated purpose. For example, Manfred Clynes
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describes a computer program that performs compositions by apply-
ing a single performer’s manner of interpretation to previously un-
encountered material, across all instrumental voices [5]. He states
that “our computer program plays music so that it is impossible to
believe that no human performer is involved,” which he qualiﬁes by
explaining the role of the human performer as a user of the software,
who “instills the [musical performance] principles in the appropri-
ate way”. Taking an entirely different approach, David Cope, argues
that a Turing-like test for creativity would be more appropriate to his
work than a Turing test for intelligence [6]. On the other hand, he has
called his well-known project “Experiments in Musical Intelligence”
and he also makes reference to “intelligent music composition”. Fur-
thermore, he states that his system generates “convincing” music in
the style of a given composer (by training the system with a cor-
pus of human-composed music), and one can infer that, in this con-
text, “convincing” at least approximates the notion of human indis-
tinguishability. With a more critical articulation, Pearce and Wiggins
carefully differentiate between a test for what Cope calls “convinc-
ing” and a Turing test for intelligence [19]. As they point out, despite
the resemblance of the two approaches, testing for intelligence is dis-
tinct from determining the “(non-)membership of a machine compo-
sition in a set of human composed pieces of music”. They also note
the signiﬁcant difference between an interactive test and one involv-
ing passive observation.
4 Broadening the interactive horizon
One reason for isolating these two threads is to recast Turing’s ideas
in a wider social context, one that is better attuned to the contempo-
rary social understanding of the role of technology research: namely,
that it is primarily intended (or even expected) to enhance our lives.
Outside the thought experiment, in the realm of practical application,
one might redirect the resources for developing a successful Turing
test candidate (e.g., for the Loebner Prize) and instead apply them
toward a different kind of interactive system. This proposed system
could be built so that it might be easily identiﬁed as a machine (even
if occasionally mistaken for a human), which seemingly runs counter
to the spirit of the Turing test. However, with an altered emphasis,
one could imagine the primary function of such a machine as engag-
ing humans in a continuous process of interaction, for a variety of
purposes, including (but not limited to) stimulating human creativity
and providing a realm for aesthetic exploration.
One example of this kind of system is musical improvisation soft-
ware that interacts with human performers in real time, in a mutually
inﬂuential relationship between human and computer, such as Lewis’
Voyager. In his software design, the interaction model strongly re-
sembles the way in which Turing describes a computer’s behaviour:
it is responsive, yet it does not always give the expected answer, and
it might interrupt the human interlocutor or steer the interaction in a
different direction (see [16]). In the case of an interactive improvising
music system, the environment in which the human and computer in-
teract is not verbal conversation, but rather, a culturally speciﬁc aes-
thetic context for collaborative music-making. In this sense, a musi-
cal improvisation is not an interrogation in the manner presented by
Turing, yet “test” conversations and musical improvisations are ex-
amples of free-ranging and open-ended human-computer interaction.
Among other things, this kind of interaction can serve as a basis for
philosophical enquiry and cognitive theory that is indeed very much
in the spirit of Turing’s 1950 paper [24] (see also [15] and [17]).
Adam Linson’s Odessa is another intelligent musical system that
is similarly rooted in freely improvised music (for a detailed descrip-
tion, see [18]). It borrows from Brooks’ design approach in mod-
elling the behaviour of an intentional agent, thus clearly taking up
the ﬁrst thread that has been drawn out here. Signiﬁcantly, it iso-
lates this thread (intentional agency) for study by abstaining from
a direct implementation of many of the available methods for hu-
man emulation (aimed at the second thread), thus resulting in trans-
parently nonhuman musical behaviour. Nonetheless, initial empiri-
cal studies suggest that the system affords an engaging and stimulat-
ing human-computer musical interaction. As the system architecture
(based on Brooks’ subsumption architecture) is highly extensible, fu-
ture iterations of the system may add techniques for approximating
ﬁne-grained qualities of human musicianship. In the meantime, how-
ever, further studies are planned with the existing prototype, with the
aim of providing insights into aspects of human cognition as well as
intelligent musical agent design.
5 Conclusion
Ultimately, whether an interactive computer system is dealing with
an interrogator in the imitation game or musically improvising with
a human, the system must be designed to “respond in lived real
time to unexpected, real-world input” [17]. This responsiveness takes
the form of what sociologist Andrew Pickering calls the “dance of
agency”, in which a reciprocal interplay of resistance and accom-
modation produces unpredictable emergent results over time [20].
This description of a sustained, continuous play of forces that “in-
teractively stablize” each other could be applied to freely improvised
music, whether performed by humans exclusively, or by humans and
computers together. Pickering points out a concept similar to the pro-
cess of interactive stabilisation, ‘heterogeneous engineering’, elabo-
rated in the work of his colleague John Law (see [12]); the latter, in
its emphasis on productive output, is perhaps more appropriate to the
musical context of free improvisation.
Although these theoretical characterisations may seem abstract,
they concretely pertain to the present topic in that they seek to ad-
dress the “open-ended and performative interplay between agents
that are not capable of dominating each other” [21], where the agents
may include various combinations of humans, computers and other
entities, and the interplay may include linguistic, musical, physi-
cal and other forms of interaction. With particular relevance to the
present context, Pickering applies his conceptual framework of agent
interplay to the animal-like robots of Turing’s contemporary, cyber-
netics pioneer Grey Walter, and those of Brooks, designed and built
decades later [21]. Returning to the main theme, following Brooks,
“the dynamics of the interaction of the robot and its environment are
primary determinants of the structure of its intelligence” [3]. Thus,
independent of its human resemblance, an agent’s ability to negotiate
with an unstructured and highly dynamic musical, social or physi-
cal environment can be treated as a measure of intelligence closely
aligned with what Turing thought to be discoverable with his pro-
posed test.
REFERENCES
[1] C. Ariza, ‘The interrogator as critic: The turing test and the evaluation
of generative music systems’, Computer Music Journal, 33(2), 48–70,
(2009).
[2] J.L. Barrett and A.H. Johnson, ‘The role of control in attributing inten-
tional agency to inanimate objects’, Journal of Cognition and Culture,
3(3), 208–217, (2003).
[3] R.A. Brooks, Cambrian intelligence: the early history of the new AI,
MIT Press, 1999.
AISB/IACAP 2012 Symposium: Revisiting Turing and his Test: Comprehensiveness, Qualia, and the Real World 18
[4] A. Clark, Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again,
MIT Press, 1997.
[5] M. Clynes, ‘Generative principles of musical thought: Integration of
microstructure with structure’, Communication and Cognition AI, Jour-
nal for the Integrated Study of Artiﬁcial Intelligence, Cognitive Science
and Applied Epistemology, 3(3), 185–223, (1986).
[6] D. Cope, Computer Models of Musical Creativity, MIT Press, 2005.
[7] G. Csibra, ‘Goal attribution to inanimate agents by 6.5-month-old in-
fants’, Cognition, 107(2), 705–717, (2008).
[8] R.T. Dean, Hyperimprovisation: Computer-interactive sound improvi-
sation, AR Editions, Inc., 2003.
[9] H. Hendriks-Jansen, Catching ourselves in the act: Situated activity,
interactive emergence, evolution, and human thought, MIT Press, 1996.
[10] I. Kira´ly, B. Jovanovic, W. Prinz, G. Aschersleben, and G. Gergely,
‘The early origins of goal attribution in infancy’, Consciousness and
Cognition, 12(4), 752–769, (2003).
[11] G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied
Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought, Basic Books, 1999.
[12] J. Law, ‘On the social explanation of technical change: The case of the
portuguese maritime expansion’, Technology and Culture, 28(2), 227–
252, (1987).
[13] D.B. Lenat, ‘Cyc: A large-scale investment in knowledge infrastruc-
ture’, Communications of the ACM, 38(11), 33–38, (1995).
[14] D.B. Lenat, ‘The voice of the turtle: Whatever happened to ai?’, AI
Magazine, 29(2), 11, (2008).
[15] G. Lewis, ‘Interacting with latter-day musical automata’, Contempo-
rary Music Review, 18(3), 99–112, (1999).
[16] G. Lewis, ‘Too many notes: Computers, complexity and culture in voy-
ager’, Leonardo Music Journal, 33–39, (2000).
[17] G. Lewis, ‘Improvising tomorrow’s bodies: The politics of transduc-
tion’, E-misfe´rica, 4.2, (2007).
[18] A. Linson, C. Dobbyn, and R. Laney, ‘Improvisation without represen-
tation: artiﬁcial intelligence and music’, in Proceedings of Music, Mind,
and Invention: Creativity at the Intersection of Music and Computation,
(2012).
[19] M. Pearce and G. Wiggins, ‘Towards a framework for the evaluation of
machine compositions’, in Proceedings of the AISB, pp. 22–32, (2001).
[20] A. Pickering, The mangle of practice: Time, agency, and science, Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1995.
[21] A. Pickering, The cybernetic brain: Sketches of another future, Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 2010.
[22] D. Poulin-Dubois and T.R. Shultz, ‘The development of the understand-
ing of human behavior: From agency to intentionality’, in Developing
Theories of Mind, eds., Janet W. Astington, Paul L. Harris, and David R.
Olson, 109–125, Cambridge University Press, (1988).
[23] R. Rowe, Machine musicianship, MIT Press, 2001.
[24] A.M. Turing, ‘Computing machinery and intelligence’, Mind, 59(236),
433–460, (1950).
AISB/IACAP 2012 Symposium: Revisiting Turing and his Test: Comprehensiveness, Qualia, and the Real World 19
